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Generational conflict affects the supply of public welfare services, and the rising share of 
elderly is seen as a threat to educational spending. We offer an analysis of spending in child 
care, primary and lower secondary education, and care for the elderly related to the size of 
young and old voters. Using panel data from Denmark for the period 1989-1996, we find that 
the elderly are reducing spending in child care and education, but the young do not threaten 
elderly care. It is a disadvantage for both the elderly and the young to be part of a large 
cohort. 
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Voter groups compete for shares of the public budget, and recently the focus has been set to 
the conflict between age groups in educational spending. The rising share of elderly voters is 
seen as a threat to educational spending. Poterba (1997, 1998) analyzes the negative 
correlation between the share of elderly and educational spending across US states. Fernandez 
and Rogerson (1997) report similar results, while the relationship is challenged by Ladd and 
Murray (2001). Harris et al. (2001) confirm that a growing share of elderly tends to depress 
spending in education analyzed at the school district level. Similar results are reported in 
European studies such as Borge and Rattsø (1995) for Norway and Grob and Wolter (2005) 
for Switzerland. Most of this literature links elderly voters to spending for schools. We extend 
this evidence to analyze the determination of child care, primary and lower secondary 
education, and care for the elderly taking into account both young and old. The 
decentralization of services for the young and the old in the Scandinavian welfare states, here 
Denmark, allows for the simultaneous analysis of several age groups and services.  
 
Welfare states are first and for all about redistribution over time to finance public welfare 
services. In the short run this redistribution implies a conflict between generations. Public 
welfare services are redistributive and each of them has a client group typically defined by 
age. In the literature, these services are described as ‘concentrated benefits’, ‘directed 
spending’ and ‘particularistic goods’. The services can be understood in terms of congestion. 
With full crowding, the publicly provided services are private goods, and the degree of 
crowding is an empirical issue.  
 
In the Scandinavian welfare states, the relevant public services are decentralized to local 
governments. The allocation of public welfare services between age groups is determined in 
the context of a local democracy. This is a challenge to the standard Musgrave-Oates-Tiebout 
model of local public finance assuming local public goods and benefit taxation. An 
understanding of the generational conflict must take into account the role of different voter 
age groups in the allocation of redistributive services.  
 





of public services to the growing number of elderly. Large cohorts now enter age groups with 
high demand for public care. Resources to expand services for the elderly must be financed 
by higher taxes or reallocation from age groups in decline. The resistance to higher taxes and 
conflicting claims from other groups may imply that the elderly loose out. They may 
experience the disadvantage of being many. Borge and Rattsø (1995) address this concern in 
an early study of Norway, and they find a clear negative effect of age group size on spending 
per client. Lotz and Aagesen (1997) offer a number of partial analyses of the relationship 
between size of age groups, measures of service output, and spending per client for Denmark. 
In this paper we integrate the partial relationships between age group size and spending in a 
full demand model of public welfare services. Strömberg (1998) separates between demand 
and political influence of the elderly in neighboring Sweden. He finds that a rising share of 
elderly increases their political influence, but the results are not inconsistent with a decline in 
spending per elderly when the number of elderly goes up. 
 
We have a dataset of local government service spending and age groups of the population for 
the period 1989-1996 made available to us by the Danish Ministry of Finance. The panel 
allows an investigation of the relationship between shares of age groups and spending per 
inhabitant in the relevant age groups for three services: child care, education, and care for the 
elderly. We address the methodological challenge of Tiebout-bias by using historical 
measures of the age composition as instruments in line with Harris et al. (2001) and Ladd and 
Murray (2001). Our estimates indicate that the elderly reduce spending in child care and 
education, but the young do not threaten services for the elderly. The results furthermore 
support the hypothesis that it is a disadvantage for both the young and the elderly to be part of 
a large cohort. 
 
Section 2 clarifies the understanding of generational conflict and (dis)advantage of large 
cohorts. The institutional setting in Denmark is described in Section 3, and Section 4 presents 
data and empirical specification of the analysis. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 






2. Understanding generational conflict 
 
The demand model for public services is the obvious starting point to understand 
demographic shifts and conflicts between age groups. Different age groups have different 
demand for public services. The standard understanding of demographic shift is that the 
identity of the median voter changes, as suggested by Inman (1978). When the median voter 
gets older, public spending will shift from services to the young to care for the elderly. The 
budget constraint shows the disadvantage of being part of a large cohort. Given the available 
finances and service level, a larger client group will be more expensive to serve. The cost 
effect is likely to reduce spending per client when the number of clients goes up. The demand 
models consequently identify a tradeoff between political influence versus service costs. On 
the one hand increased size of a voter group means more political influence, but on the other 
hand spending must go up to keep the service level constant for the whole group.  
 
Empirical analyses often have assumed a broader ‘community preference’ including 
demographic descriptives since the median voter assumes single dimensionality. Cutler et al. 
(1993) analyze the effects of demographic shift for local spending levels in this context. The 
normative implications of ‘community composition’ are worked out by Schwab and Oates 
(1991). The research has shifted towards the understanding of political institutions and an 
early contribution by Craig and Inman (1986) proposes a voter group decision model, where 
the actual outcome is a weighted average of each group's preferred allocation. More recent 
contributions apply probabilistic voting models as the foundation for fiscal demand analysis 
and Holtz-Eakin (1992) presents the linkages between median voter and probabilistic demand 
models. Borge et al. (1995) provide an empirical analysis of how reallocation of resources 
between different age groups is affected by interest group pressure. 
 
Recent theoretical contributions have added arguments beyond this simple understanding of 
generational conflict. Strömberg (1998) argues that altruism may modify the conflicting 
claims. The selfish battle for age group influence does not capture the links between 
generations at any point in time and the intertemporal distribution over the life time for each 
individual. Duncombe et al. (2003) find in survey data that elderly with grand children are 





cohort may include economies of scale that will modify the cost effect. In this case, spending 
per client may go down with increasing size of an age group even when service level for each 
individual in the group goes up.  
 
Dynamic intergenerational redistribution has been investigated in particular with respect to 
social security, and Grossman and Helpman (1998) have worked out an overlapping 
generation (OLG) framework to discuss political aspects. Holtz-Eakin et al. (2004) apply the 
OLG framework to analyze how aging affects school expenditures and economic growth. 
Their simulations imply that aging has a negative output effects through lower school 
expenditures, and that this dominates the positive effects of lower taxes. On the other hand, 
Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) develop an OLG model where increased longevity has a 
positive effect on education funding and economic growth. The intuition is that working 
adults experience a higher probability of survival into retirement, and choose to increase their 
support for schooling to increase the returns on their savings for retirement. 
 
Voting behavior of age groups reflects other factors than their own services. Brueckner and 
Joo (1991) show how homeowners have incentives to take into account the capitalization 
effect of public services. In our context elderly voters may support school spending to raise 
the value of their house. The finding of Harris et al. (2001) that the generational conflict is 
more severe for state financed school spending than for locally financed spending indicate 
that capitalization weakens the conflict between young and old at the local level. Brunner and 
Balsdon (2004) use survey data and find that support for school spending generally declines 
with age, but less so for local spending than for state spending. Their results are consistent 
with both capitalization of local spending into housing values and intergenerational altruism. 
 
The relationships between age groups and age related public welfare services are complex and 
related to several adjustment mechanisms. Our data allow a reduced form investigation of the 






3. Public welfare services and age groups in Denmark  
 
Denmark has 275 local governments
1 primarily producing child care, primary and lower 
secondary education, care for the elderly, and local infrastructure.  Home care and 
institutionalized care (i.e. nursing homes) for the elderly represent about half of local 
government spending. Education and child care take another ¼ of the spending. The 
government is among the most decentralized in the world. The local governments produce 
about 20% of the national product and the full local public sector (including county level with 
hospitals) is about 30% of national product or 50% of total public spending. Lotz (1991, 
1998) presents the rational of the Danish design. Mourtizen (1991) offers a comprehensive 
evaluation of the functioning of the local political system. 
 
Table 1 
Age composition, spending per client, private income and block grants 
Year  Age composition (%)  Spending per client 





1989 7.5  11.3  3.6  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
1990 7.6  10.9  3.7  1.00  1.01  0.96  1.00  1.04 
1991 7.9  10.5  3.7  1.01  1.04  0.93  1.00  0.95 
1992 8.1  10.2  3.8  1.04  1.05  0.91  1.01  0.98 
1993 8.3  9.9  3.9  1.08  1.09  0.90  1.02  1.09 
1994 8.5  9.8  3.9  1.13  1.10  0.90  1.08  1.05 
1995 8.8  9.7  3.9  1.10  1.12  0.87  1.08  1.03 
1996 9.0  9.7  3.9  1.13  1.13  0.90  1.12  0.73 
All figures are weighted averages. Spending per client, private income and block grants are in 1996 prices and 
measured as an index where the average value for 1989 equals unity. Private income and block grants are 
measured per capita. 
 
The present study concentrates on child care, education, and care for the elderly. These 
services are publicly provided private goods directed towards specific subgroups of the 
population. The relevant ‘client’ group for child care is children aged 0-6 years and for 
primary and lower secondary education children aged 7-15 years. Care for the elderly covers 
only a share of the elderly population and elderly 80 years and above represent the main 
target group. Spending in care for the elderly is scaled by the share of the population 80 years 
and above. The development of spending per ‘client’ and the population shares of the client 
                         





groups are displayed in Table 1. During the period under study (1989-1996) the major 
demographic shift occurred in the younger age groups. Children eligible for child care have 
increased their share of the population, whereas children eligible for primary and lower 
secondary education have been in decline. There has been a modest increase in the share of 
the population 80 years and above. 
 
The two younger age groups have experienced a similar development of spending per client. 
Child care spending care per child 0-6 years and educational spending per student both 
increased by 13% in real terms from 1989 to 1996, which is equivalent to an average annual 
growth rate of 1.8%. In the care for the elderly sector spending per inhabitants 80 years and 
above declined by 10% (or 1.5% per year). 
 
The raw data in Table 1 do not provide any clear evidence regarding the relationship between 
group size and spending per client. In primary education and care for the elderly there seem to 
be a disadvantage of being part of a large cohort. An increasing share of elderly is associated 
with lower spending per elderly, whereas a declining population share for children 7-15 years 
of age is associated with higher educational spending per student. On the other hand, 
spending on child care per child 0-6 years of age has increased in a period with a growing 
population share. Generational conflict and the disadvantage of being part of a large cohort 
must be investigated in the context of a model including other determinants of public welfare 
spending. 
 
The local income tax is the main source of revenue for Danish local governments and 
amounts to nearly 70% of total revenue. The average annual growth of the income tax base 
(private income in Table 1) was 1.6% during the period under study. The equalization system 
is to large extent arranged as pure redistribution among the local governments. Transfers to 
local governments with high spending needs and/or low tax bases are financed by 
contributions from authorities with low spending needs and/or high tax bases. As a 
consequence, block grants from the national government only account for 10% of total 
revenue. The block grants have been quite stable during the period under study.
2 
 
                         






Descriptive statistics for the change in population shares (%-points), 1989-1996 
Age group  Min  1. quart. Median  3. quart. Max  St.dev. 
0-6 years (CH06)  -1.4 0.7 1.3 1.7 3.5  0.74 
7-15 years (CH715)  -5.1 -2.2 -1.7 -1.3 0.7 0.87 
80 years and above (EL80+)  -0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.6  0.32 
67 years and above (EL67+)  -4.4 -0.1 0.3  0.8  3.4 0.95 
The figures are based on data for 275 local governments. 
 
The models estimated include community and year fixed effects, and the crucial issue is 
whether there is sufficient time series variation in the data. More precisely, do the local 
governments experience sufficiently different demographic development during the period 
under study? Information on the time series variation is provided in Table 2 where we report 
descriptive statistics for the change in population shares from 1989 to 1996. It is evident that 
the aggregate development in Table 1 masks substantial variation across local governments. 
The change in the share of children 0-6 years of age varies from a reduction of 1.4 percentage 
points to an increase of 3.5 percentage points, a sample range of nearly 5 percentage points. 
The interquartile range is 1 percentage point. The variation is equally large for the share of 
children 7-15 years of age, with a sample range of nearly 6 percentage points and an 
interquartile range of nearly 1 percentage point. It can also be seen that the variation is 
substantially less for the share of elderly 80 years and above. The sample range is only 2 
percentage points and the standard deviation is less than half of that for the two younger age 
groups. A broader measure of the elderly, the share of the population 67 years and above, 
shows slightly more variation than the two younger age groups. In the empirical analysis this 
broader measure of the elderly will be used as an alternative to capture generational conflict. 
Although the time span in short, we conclude that the data set is rich in the sense that it 
includes local governments with very different demographic development.  
 
4. Data and empirical specification 
 
The analysis is based on a balanced panel data set covering all 275 Danish local governments 
during the period 1989-1996. The data are based on local government accounts and 
population statistics, and have been made available to us by the Danish Ministry of Finance. 
The dependent variable ( it E ) is real spending per client in child care, education, or care for 





all three service sectors: 
 
12 3 4 log( ) log( ) log( 06 ) log( 715 ) log( 80 ) it it it it it
tii t
ET I N CC H C H E L β ββ β
αηε
=+ + + +
+++
                   (1) 
 
The explanatory variables are per capita income ( it TINC ), the share of children 0-6 years of 
age ( 06it CH ), the share of children 7-15 years of age ( 715it CH ), and the share of the 
population 80 years and above ( 80 it EL + ).
3 Spending and total income are measured in real 
terms. A set of time dummies ( t α ) capture time specific factors common to all local 
governments. Finally, ( i η ) is a community specific term and  it ε  an error term. The 
specification is similar to Poterba (1997), but is generalized to a broader set of public welfare 
services. 
 
We started out with private income and block grants as separate external sources of revenue, 
but in line with other studies of Danish local governments we have not obtained reliable 
estimates of the block grant effect. Block grants are partly selffinanced (see Section 3) and 
this may explain the unstable estimates. Below we report results using the sum of private 
income and block grant (TINC) as income variable. The effects of the demographic variables 
are robust to alternative specifications of the income variables.  
 
All equations estimated take account of community specific fixed effects. The statistical 
inference is then based on the time series variation in the data, how changes in the age 
composition of the population over time affect the composition of services. The model is 
estimated with the least squares dummy variable method and by differencing out the 
community specific effect. The main methodological challenge is the importance of mobility. 
If the client groups move from local governments with low spending per client to local 
governments with high spending per client, population shares and spending per client are 
jointly determined, and Tiebout-bias is a potential problem. The direction of the Tiebou-bias 
is likely to differ between the direct effects and the cross effects.
4 To see this, suppose that 
                         
3 Description and summary statistics for the variables are reported in the appendix Table A1. 





both the direct effects and the cross effects are negative. Since the Tiebout-effect produces a 
positive correlation between the relative size of the client group and spending per client in 
their own sector, the true direct effect is likely to be underestimated (in absolute value) when 
the simultaneity problem is not taken into account. On the other hand, since the different 
population groups compete for resources, the Tiebout-effect produces a negative correlation 
between the relative size of a client group and spending per client in other sectors. Then the 
true cross effects are likely to be overestimated (in absolute value). The potential Tiebout-bias 
is handled by use of instruments. We follow Harris et al. (2001) and Ladd and Murray (2001), 
and use historical measures of the age composition as instruments. In addition we utilize that 
business cycle effects on population growth and age composition vary between urban and 
rural communities. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
The core panel data model with data for 1989-1996 and using community specific fixed 
effects is presented as the first set of estimates (fixed effects, baseline) in Table 3. The direct 
elasticities are significantly negative, i.e. CH06, CH715 and EL80+ come out with negative 
signs for child care, education, and care for the elderly respectively. The disadvantage of 
being part of a large cohort is strongly supported. Spending per client tends to be reduced 
when relative group size increases. The elasticities range from -0.64 in care for the elderly to -
0.79 in child care, and are of roughly of the same magnitude in the three sectors.  
 
The cross effects capture generational conflict. The main effect identified is that an increased 
share of elderly has a significant negative effect on spending in child care and education, i.e. 
the elderly crowd out spending for the young. The crowding out effect is stronger for child 
care than for education. There is no evidence of the opposite effect that the younger age 
groups contribute to lower spending in care for the elderly.
                                                                              







Variable  Fixed effects, baseline  Fixed effects, additional controls Differencing 
 Child  care  Education  Elderly 
care 
Child care  Education  Elderly 
care 
Child care  Education  Elderly 
care 














































































   






   






   
             
Observations  2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200  275  275  275 
2
adj R   0.951 0.931 0.920 0.955 0.933 0.921 0.443 0.284 0.203 
Dependent variables are log of spending per client for the three public services, time dummies are included in the fixed effects regressions, and a constant term in the 







In the second set of estimates we include some additional controls. These are population size 
(POP), the share of socialists in the local council (SOC), and female work participation 
(FWORKP).
5 Female work participation is associated with higher resource use in all three 
sectors (reflecting demand for child care and day care services for younger school children, 
and less family based care for the elderly) and that growing communities are able to exploit 
economies of scale.
6 The impacts of relative group size are very robust to the inclusion of 
additional controls. The main difference is that the impact of the share of children 0-6 years in 
child care is somewhat reduced in magnitude, making the direct elasticities even more similar 
across sectors. 
 
The community specific effects can alternatively be eliminated by differencing, and the final 
set of estimations in Table 3 is based on the development from 1989 to 1996. By increasing 
the frequency from one to seven years, the length of the time period also becomes similar to 
the US studies by Poterba (1997), Harris et al. (2001), and Ladd and Murray (2001) that use 
data for every 10th year. The direct effects of relative group size come out highly significant 
also in this case, but the quantitative effects are somewhat reduced compared to the baseline 
estimates. The main generational conflict is still that the elderly impose lower spending for 
the younger age groups, but the impact in education is not statistically significant in this case. 
 
The estimated income elasticities in Table 3 show that spending in child care is most 
responsive to changes in total income, whereas care for the elderly is least responsive. The 
lower elasticities for child care and education in the fixed effects specification may reflect 
that these estimates to a larger extent are affected by transitory changes in income. 
                         
5 Female work participation is measured as the fraction of women 20-44 years that is employed. 
6 The weak effect of the share of socialists may reflect that the time series variation is limited as we only have 






Fixed effects IV analysis 
First stage regressions  Second stage (IV) regressions 
Variable  log(CH06) log(CH715) log(EL80+)  Variable  Child care  Education  Elderly care 




































              
Observations 2200 2200 2200  Observation
s 
2200 2200 2200 
2
adj R   0.927 0.973 0.990  2
adj R   0.933 0.918 0.914 
Dependent variables in the right panel are log of spending per client for the three public services. Time dummies and log of total income are included in all equations. The t-









We now turn to the handling of the possible simultaneity problem due to Tiebout sorting. Our 
point of departure in addressing the simultaneity problem is Harris et al. (2001) and Ladd and 
Murray (2001), who use the age composition 10 years before as instruments. Based on the 
same reasoning we use the share of children 0-6 years lagged 10 years as instrument for 
CH715 and the share of the population 67-79 years as instrument for EL80+. The share of the 
population 20-44 years did not perform well as instrument for CH06,
7 probably reflecting 
high mobility among younger adults. Our chosen instrument for CH06 captures the fact that 
business cycle effects on population growth and age composition vary between urban and 
rural communities. The idea is that booms are associated with migration from rural to urban 
areas, and that this effect is particularly strong for younger adults with children below school 
age. We measure booms and busts by the change in the national unemployment rate (dU), 
while the urban-rural dimension is captured by the log of the population density (DE) 
measured as the number of inhabitants (lagged 10 years) per square kilometer. As instrument 
we use the product of the change in the unemployment rate and the log of population density. 
 
Table 4 shows the estimation results when Tiebout sorting is taken into account. The results 
from the first stage regressions are reported in the left panel. The instruments perform well in 
the sense that they are significantly correlated with the relevant variables. Ten years lag of the 
share of children 0-6 years of age and the share of the population 67-79 years of age are as 
expected positively correlated with respectively CH715 and EL80+. Moreover, the interaction 
term between the change in the unemployment rate and population density is significantly 
correlated with CH06. The interpretation of the negative coefficient is that the share of 




The second stage regressions in the right panel of Table 4 reveal that the direct effects of 
relative group size are negative and highly significant also when they are instrumented.
9 The 
estimates of the share of children 7-15 years in education and the share of elderly 80 years 
                         
7 The variable was insignificant in the first stage regression. 
8 Although the first stage regressions explain more than 90% of the variation in the variables to be instrumented, 
overfitting is not a problem. The reason is that only the variation beyond fixed effects and time dummies are 
used to estimate the parameters of interest. When this is taken into account, the firs stage regressions explain 20-
45% of the relevant variation in the variables to be instrumented. 





and above in care for the elderly are quite similar to the baseline fixed effects estimates. On 
the other hand the estimate of the share of children in child care increases substantially in 
absolute value. The absolute value is above unity, indicating that total spending in child care 
is reduced when the share of children 0-6 years increases.
10 Also the IV estimates indicate 
that the main generational conflict is that the elderly impose negative effects on spending for 
the young. The quantitative effects are stronger than in the baseline fixed effects models, but 
the coefficient for educational spending is less precisely estimated. The two younger age 
groups impose negative effects on each other, but not on the elderly. 
 
Table 5 
Alternative measure of the elderly 
  Fixed effects, baseline Differencing  Fixed effects IV 
Variable  Child care  Education  Child care  Education  Child care  Education 
















































        
Observations  2200  2200 275  275 2200  2200 
2
adj R   0.953 0.932 0.457 0.294 0.933 0.921 
Dependent variables are log of spending per client for the public services, time dummies are included in the 
fixed effects regressions, and a constant term in the differenced equations. The t-values in parentheses are based 
on robust standard errors. In the Fixed effects IV specification the share of the population 57-66 years of age 
lagged 10 years is used as instrument for log(EL67+). The instruments for log(CH06) and log(CH715) are the 
same as in Table 4.  
 
In Tables 3 and 4 the generational conflict between the young and the elderly were identified 
using the share of the population 80 years and above as a proxy for elderly voters. The main 
motivation for this formulation is that the elderly 80 years and above is the main target group 
for care for the elderly. However, most elderly voters are below 80 years of age and they may 
also crowd out spending for the young.
11 In Table 5 we identify the generational conflict 
                                                                              
affected by the use of instruments. 
10 The elasticity remains above unity in absolute value also when we include additional controls or remove the 
community specific term by differencing. 
11 In 1996 the elderly 67 years and above made up 13.4% of the population, whereas elderly 80 years and above 





using the share of the population 67 years and above as proxy for elderly voters. This 
definition of the elderly is also more in line with the US studies of generational conflict that 
use the share of the population above 65. It turns out that the generational conflict in most 
cases becomes stronger with this broader definition of the elderly. Moreover, in this case the 
negative impact of elderly in education is statistically significant also with differencing and 
instruments. 
 
It is of interest to compare our findings with those from other studies. Since the international 
literature has focused on educational spending, the explicit comparison of estimates must be 
restricted to this sector. US studies have focused on generational conflict, and the results vary 
substantially across studies. Poterba (1997) finds strong evidence of generational conflict 
using state level data. He estimates the elasticity of school spending with respect to the share 
of elderly to be -0.26. Much weaker effects are found on lower level data. Harris et al. (2001) 
estimate elasticities of up to -0.10 using school district data, while Ladd and Murray (2001) 
find no evidence of generational conflict using county level data. Our estimates range from -
0.10 to -0.15 when elderly is measured as the share of the population 67 years and above, and 
are most similar to the findings of Harris et al. (2001).
12 In addition, we document that this 
generational conflict is even more severe for child care, but that the younger age groups do 
not contribute to lower spending in care for the elderly. 
 
Consistent with other studies, we find that there is a disadvantage for school children to be 
part of a large cohort. The direct elasticities are in the order of -0.6 to -0.7, and they are all 
significantly less than 0 and significantly larger than -1. Educational spending increases when 
the number of pupils increases, but not sufficiently to avoid a reduction in spending per pupil. 
The estimated disadvantage is somewhat larger than in US (Harris et al., 2001; Ladd and 
Murray, 2001) and German (Kempkes, 2007) studies using local government data, but less 
than in Poterba’s (1997) study of the US states.
13 Also Grob and Walter (2005), analyzing 
Swiss cantons, find that educational spending per student decreases when the number of 
students increases. Our analysis clearly shows that the disadvantage of being part of large 
                         
12 Grob and Wolter (2005) use data for Swiss cantons (not local governments), and do also find evidence of 
generational conflict. They do not report a comparable elasticity, but we have calculated it to -0.23. Their 
finding seems to confirm that analyses of higher level government tend to find stronger generational conflict. 





cohort extends to child care and care for the elderly, and that the order of magnitude is 
roughly the same as in the educational sector. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The Scandinavian local governments arrange public welfare services for the young and the 
old, and demographic shifts affect the political influence of the different age groups and the 
costs of providing the services. Whereas earlier contributions analyzing generational conflict 
and the (dis)advantage of being part of a large cohort have focused on educational spending, 
the decentralization of public welfare services in Scandinavia allows for a simultaneous 
analysis of services for the young and the elderly. 
 
The econometric analysis is based on a panel data set for local governments in Denmark 
during the period 1989-1996, and focuses on child care, education, and care for the elderly. In 
line with earlier European and US studies, we find evidence of generational conflict in the 
sense that a larger share of elderly voters reduces educational spending. We also identify 
disadvantage of being part of a large cohort as a larger share of students in the population 
reduces educational spending per student. The extension to include services for the elderly 
and child care offers some new results. Elderly voters also reduce spending in child care, the 
young do not threaten services for the elderly, and both the young and the elderly have a 
disadvantage of being part of a large cohort. 
 
                                                                              









Variable Description  Mean 
(st.dev.) 
Expenditure per client in 
child care 
Child care expenditures per child 0-6 years, 
Danish kroner (DKK), fixed 1996 prices  
28779 
(10055) 
Educational expenditure per 
client 
Educational expenditures per youth 7-15 
years, DKK 1996 
34510 
(4381) 
Care for the elderly 
expenditures per client 
Care for the elderly expenditures per 
inhabitant 80 years and above, DKK 1996 
112570 
(23906) 
Total income (TINC)  The sum of private income per capita and 
block grants per capita, DKK 1996 
90188 
(14837) 
The share of children 0-6 
years of age (CH06) 




The share of children 7-15 
years of age (CH715) 




The share of elderly 67 years 
and above (EL67+) 
The share of the population 67 years and 
above, January 1 
0.135 
(0.033) 
The share of elderly 80 years 
and above (EL80+) 
The share of the population 80 years and 
above, January 1 
0.037 
(0.012) 
Population size (POP)  Total number of inhabitants, January 1  18826 
(36482) 




Female work participation 
(FWORKP) 
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